Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Tesco American, Inc. v. Lether : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ellen Maycock; David C. Wright; Kruse, Landa & Maycock; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Francis J. Nielson; Arnovitz, Smith & Nielson; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Tesco American, Inc. v. Richard T. Lether, No. 930762 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5668

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COUfTT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPE

DOCKET NO

f\T>o*b~L-CA-

TESCO AMERICAN, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appeal No. 930762-CA
vs.
RICHARD T. LETHER, d/b/a
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE,

Priority 15

Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal From A Judgment Of The Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable David S. Young
Third District Court Judge

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
DAVID C. WRIGHT - 5566
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
FRANCIS J. NIELSON
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON
310 South Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0524
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

FILED
MAR 21994
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TESCO AMERICAN, INC., a Utah corporation, ;
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

]
)
]

RICHARD T. LETHER, d/b/a
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE,

;1
;

Defendant/Appellee.

Appeal No. 930762-CA

Priority 15

]

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal From A Judgment Of The Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable David S. Young
Third District Court Judge

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
DAVID C. WRIGHT - 5566
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
FRANCIS J. NIELSON
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON
310 South Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0524
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

1

ARGUMENT

2

UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607, NEGOTIATION OF AN
INSTRUMENT MARKED PAID IN FULL OR WITH OTHER WORDS OF
SIMILAR MEANING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION WITHOUT A SEPARATE WRITING IN WHICH THE
PAYEE ACCEPTS THE INSTRUMENT AS FULL PAYMENT OF THE
UNDERLYING OBLIGATION
CONCLUSION

2
6

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Telephone, 844 P.2d 332 (Utah 1992)
Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979)

3, 4
2

STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§68-3-5

4

UTAH CODE ANN.

§70A-1-106

6

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-1-207

6

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-311

1

UTAH CODE ANN.

§70A-2-711

1,5

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-2-713

2, 5

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-102

3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-104

2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§70A-3-607

passim

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-103

2

ii

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are dispositive of this appeal:

1.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-607 provides in full as follows:

The negotiation of an instrument marked "paid in full," "payment in full,"
"full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, or the negotiation of an
instrument accompanied by a statement containing such words or words of similar
meaning, does not establish an accord and satisfaction which binds the payee or
prevents the collection of any remaining amount owed upon the underlying
obligation, unless the payee personally, or by an officer or employee with actual
authority to settle claims, agrees in writing to accept the amount stated in the
instrument as full payment of the obligation.1

2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-2-711 provides in full as follows:

(1)
Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods
involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract
(Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so
may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a)
"cover" and have damages under the next section as to all
the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract;
or
(b)
recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter
(Section 70A-2-713).
(2)

Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also

(a)
if the goods have been identified recover them as provided
in this chapter (Section 70A-2-502); or
(b)
in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the
goods as provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-716).

1

Section 3-607 has been repealed by L. 1993, ch 237, § 62, effective July 1, 1993, and reenacted, though heavily
amended, as part of revised Article 3, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-311.

1

(3)
On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer
has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments
made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection,
receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them
in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 70A-2-706).
3.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-2-713 provides in full as follows:

(1)
Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of
market price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or
repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time
when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any
incidental and consequential damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2)
Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in
cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of
arrival.

ARGUMENT
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607, NEGOTIATION OF AN
INSTRUMENT MARKED PAID IN FULL OR WITH OTHER
WORDS OF SIMILAR MEANING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITHOUT A SEPARATE
WRITING IN WHICH THE PAYEE ACCEPTS THE INSTRUMENT
AS FULL PAYMENT OF THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs commercial paper, including the
rights and obligations connected with a negotiable instrument, such as a check.

UTAH CODE

ANN. §§ 70A-3-103 and 70A-3-104(2); Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979). When an
accord and satisfaction is attempted through the use of an instrument, which is defined as "a

2

negotiable instrument," UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-102(l)(e), section 3-607 is triggered and
governs the rights and obligations of the parties.
In these circumstances, whether an accord and satisfaction exists is determined by the
following:
The negotiation of an instrument marked "paid in full," "payment in full,"
"full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, or the negotiation of an
instrument accompanied by a statement containing such words or words of similar
meaning, does not establish an accord and satisfaction which binds the payee or
prevents the collection of any remaining amount owed upon the underlying
obligation, unless the payee personally, or by an officer or employee with actual
authority to settle claims, agrees in writing to accept the amount stated in the
instrument as full payment of the obligation.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-607.2

Utah Machine's reading of section 3-607 merely begs the question. This section requires
that there be a writing in which the payee of the instrument accepts "the amount stated in the
instrument as full payment of the obligation." There is no such writing. There is only the
instrument itself. Section 3-607 states plainly that negotiating the instrument is not an accord
and satisfaction regardless of how it is marked. Case law prior to the enactment of section 3-607
may have held otherwise, but was changed by section 3-607.
Utah Machine relies heavily on Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Telephone, 844
P.2d 332 (Utah 1992). Estate Landscape was decided without reference to section 3-607 because
the court was required to apply pre-1990 law. See L. 1990, ch. 312 § 1, effective April 23, 1990

2

A check is a negotiable instrument "if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand. . . . " UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70A-3-104(2)(b). The Utah Machine check meets these requirements.

3

and UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-5. The complaint in Estate Landscape was filed in 1985, five years
before section 3-607 was enacted. 844 P.2d at 325. In that case, "negotiation of the check
[which had been sent as payment in full] constituted acceptance of the accord and satisfaction as
a matter of law." Id. at 330.
Section 3-607 provides, however, that such negotiation, standing alone, "does not
establish and accord and satisfaction which binds the payee or prevents the collection of any
remaining amount owed upon the underlying obligation...." Along with negotiation of the
instrument, the payee must agree "in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full
payment of the obligation." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607. Indeed, that portion of section 3607 referring to "an instrument accompanied by a statement containing such words [as payment
in full] or words of similar meaning" seems to be addressed directly at Estate Landscape where,
although the instrument said nothing, an accompanying letter established the accord and
satisfaction. 844 P.2d at 324-25, 330.
Utah Machine's reading of section 3-607 would have the instrument itself serve as the
writing in which the accord and satisfaction is reflected. If that were correct, section 3-607
would be meaningless. Section 3-607 was passed to prevent the sometimes harsh results of take
it or leave it propositions where creditors, eager to obtain any return at all, risked losing their
rights to recover the balance of the obligation by accepting partial payment.3

3

Utah Machine's interpretation would restrict application of section 3-607 to situations where such checks are sent
to a "lock box" and processed. The plaint language of the statue belies such a narrow application.

4

Section 3-607 also avoids ambiguity by requiring a separate writing in which the
underlying obligation is discharged. The "agreement" offered by Utah Machine is anything but
clear. The handwritten words on the back of the check are hardly legible. (See Appendix 1.)
Utah Machine claims that the handwriting says "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court."
(Brief of Appellee at 6.) Even if the instalment itself could serve as the agreement, this language
hardly constitutes an agreement "to accept the amount stated on the instrument as full payment of
the obligation."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-3-607.

Moreover, the words "per court" deserve special attention. There is no court order stating
that the repayment discussed at the hearing on the pre-judgment writ was intended to satisfy the
underlying obligation in full. Even Utah Machine concedes that it was instructed to deliver the
check to counsel for Tesco. (Brief of Appellee at 5-6.) There was no representation that a refund
of the purchase price to which Tesco is entitled as a matter of law under

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 70A-2-711(1) was to be accepted as full payment of the underlying obligation.
Tesco tried to recover the machinery it had purchased, including resorting to a writ of
replevin. (R. 00180.) The contract for sale had been breached, and there is no evidence that
Tesco was waiving its right to additional damages for that breach when it accepted a return of the
purchase price. "[I]n addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid," damages in
this case are measured by either the cost of cover or the difference between the contract price and
the market price.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 70A-2-711, 70A-2-713.

5

In addition, UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-207(2) accompanied the 1990 enactment of
section 3-607. Section 1-207 provides that, although ordinarily a party may preserve its rights by
performing or promising to perform by using such words as "under protest," id at § 1-207(1),
there is no such application to an accord and satisfaction "governed by section 70A-3-607." Id.
at § 1-207(2). This is true because, under section 3-607, there is no longer any need to mark a
check with words such as "under protest" because cashing the check, regardless of how the payor
has marked it, will not as a matter of law effect an accord and satisfaction. The payee must also
agree in writing that "the amount stated in the instrument" fully satisfies the underlying
obligation. There is no such writing here. There was and is no evidence that Tesco intended to
forego the benefit of its bargain.4

CONCLUSION
Because there was no written agreement in which Tesco agreed to accept the amount of
the instrument as full payment of the obligation owed to it by reason of Utah Machine's breach of
contract, there has been no accord and satisfaction. The trial court's grant of summary judgment
on that basis must, therefore, be reversed.

4

The court is referred to pp. 8-11 of Tesco's opening brief for a discussion of the breach and remedy aspects of
this case. Apparently conceding the issue, Utah Machine has not at all addressed the remedy provisions under
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code argued by Tesco. Absent an accord and satisfaction under section 3607, a return of the purchase price does not address the issue of damages. Tesco is entitled to the benefit of the
bargain. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-106. This is particularly true in this case because, knowing full well that Tesco
owned the machinery ~ title having passed upon payment (R. 00128) - Utah Machine tried to sell the machinery
for more money rather than simply delivering it to Tesco. (R. 00155-156.)
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